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The Roots of Printz
PROSLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM, NATIONAL




The USA PATRIOT Act1  and the creation of a
Department of Homeland Security signal a new chapter in the
tension between civil liberties and national security. How
secure can we be, and at what cost to our personal liberty and
personal privacy will that security come? A concomitant issue
is the role that the States can, or must, play in implementing
the plans of the national government. The leading case on this
issue is Printz v. United States.2 Here the Supreme Court
struck down the portion of the Brady Act' that required the
Chief Law Enforcement Officer (CLEO) in each county to
administer the law. One of the tasks of the CLEO under the
law was to conduct a background check on prospective gun
purchasers. The statute also provided a penalty of up to a year
© 2004 Paul Finkelman. All Rights Reserved.
Chapman Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of
Law. This Article is part of the David G. Trager Public Policy Symposium: Our New
Federalism? National Authority and Local Autonomy in the War on Terror. The author
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' Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter USA PATRIOT Act].
2 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat.




in jail for anyone who refused to comply with the law.
Presumably this penalty applied to a CLEO who failed or
refused to conduct a background check on a prospective gun
purchaser. In overturning this provision of the law, Justice
Scalia argued that the act breached the wall of separation
created by federalism. He characterized the law as
"conscripting state officers." While the majority opinion did not
use the term "unfunded mandates," this was also part of the
debate.' Oddly, none of the opinions in this case mentioned the
first Supreme Court case to deal with these issues, Prigg v.
Pennsylvania.6
In Printz both the Solicitor General of the United States
(Walter Dellinger), arguing for the constitutionality of the
provision, and Justice Scalia, finding the law unconstitutional,
invoked the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793.' The use of this statute
was unusual. Modern courts rarely discuss our constitutional
heritage of slavery,8 and when they do mention slavery, it is
usually to attack a statute, earlier decision, or the opinion of
another justice For example, a frustrated Justice Scalia
compared the majority opinion in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey"0 to the Dred Scott"
decision.'2 Similarly, Justice Brennan compared the majority
opinion in McKlesky v. Kemp" to Dred Scott.4 In his heroic
opposition to the constitutionalization of segregation in Plessy
v. Ferguson," Justice John Marshall Harlan chastised the
Court for writing an opinion that he correctly predicted would
"prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this
tribunal in the Dred Scott case."" Given the usual propensity of
justices to use slavery only to attack modern opinions that they
Printz, 521 U.S. at 925.
O Id. at 957 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302 (1793) (law setting out procedures
for the return of fugitive slaves).
' For a discussion of this, see Paul Finkelman, Teaching Slavery in
American Constitutional Law, 34 AKRON L. REV. 261 (2000), and PAUL FINKELMAN,
SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON (2d ed.
2001).
For a discussion of this, see PAUL FINKELMAN, DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD: A
BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 5-6 (1997).
10 505 U.S 833 (1992).
1 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 984 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
'3 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
14 Id. at 343-44.
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Id. at 559.
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dislike, it is startling to see both the attorney for the United
States and the Court itself invoke a proslavery statute in
support of a legal proposition. It is particularly odd to imagine
that the Solicitor General would turn to the Fugitive Slave Law
of 1793 as a viable precedent for upholding a modern statute.
Perhaps even more peculiar than the resurrection of this law is
that fact that neither the Solicitor General nor Justice Scalia
seemed to get it right.
In his majority opinion Justice Scalia wrote that some
early statutes "apparently or at least arguably required state
courts to perform functions unrelated to naturalization, such as
* . . hearing the claims of slave owners who had apprehended
fugitive slaves and issuing certificates authorizing the slave's
forced removal to the State from which he had fled .... He
noted that the Solicitor General had mentioned this statute as
one in which the United States had required state officials to
enforce a federal law. In response to this claim, Justice Scalia
wrote: "These early laws establish, at most, that the
Constitution was originally understood to permit imposition of
an obligation on state judges to enforce federal prescriptions,
insofar as those prescriptions related to matters appropriate
for the judicial power."'" After a brief discussion of these laws,
Scalia concluded: "For these reasons, we do not think the early
statutes imposing obligations on state courts imply a power of
Congress to impress the state executive into its service.""
Both Justice Scalia and Solicitor General Dellinger
ignored the history of the 1793 law, including Justice Joseph
Story's opinion upholding its constitutionality in Prigg.' In
upholding this law Justice Story nevertheless concluded that
the federal government could not force state officials to
implement the law. Oddly, Justice Scalia did not use this point
in his opinion. He also failed to note that Justice Story
developed an argument against "unfunded mandates" that was
similar to the argument used in Printz. Neither the Justices
nor Solicitor General Dellinger considered whether the
obligation to perform government functions imposed by the
1793 law was similar to that imposed by the Brady Act.
Even if we think that Prinz might have been wrongly
decided, a careful examination of the 1793 law and its history
'7 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 906 (1997).
'i Id. at 907.
19 Id.
"0 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
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can tell us a great deal about why we must be skeptical of
statutes that conscript state officials. The lessons of the 1793
law and opinion of Justice Story in Prigg also illustrate why, if
Congress wants to or needs to recruit state officials to enforce
federal law, it should be required to use carrots rather than
sticks to accomplish its goals.
This Article offers a brief history of the Fugitive Slave
Law of 1793 and the Court's decision in Prigg v. Pennsylvania,
in order to illustrate the pitfalls of relying on state officials to
implement and enforce federal policy. The Fugitive Slave Law
of 1793 was one of the first attempts by the national
government to create a law enforcement policy that could reach
into local communities on a regular basis. The Congress
assumed that state officials would willingly enforce this law. In
fact, however, many northern states were hostile to the law
and the policy behind it. As a result, states passed their own
laws, known as personal liberty laws, to protect free blacks
from wrongful seizure. Many northerners also hoped these laws
might shield fugitive slaves from being returned to bondage.
Part II of this Article describes the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793.
Part III examines the state personal liberty laws that
undermined the effectiveness of the federal law. Part IV
analyzes Prigg v. Pennsylvania, and the development of the
doctrine of "unfunded mandates." This case illustrates the
problem of "conscripting" state officials to implement federal
policy. Part V shows how Justice Story's opinion in Prigg set
the stage for federal enforcement of the fugitive slave law, and
how this might be a model for implementing national policy in
our modern age of terrorism. Finally, Part VI offers some policy
arguments in support of federal enforcement of federal laws.
These arguments are based on the experiences of the nation
with the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 and a similar enactment
in 1850, as well as the Court's decisions in both Prigg and
Printz.
II. THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW OF 1793 AND STATE
ENFORCEMENT
The Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 authorized a master or
his agent to seize an alleged fugitive slave and bring that
person before "any magistrate of a county, city, or town
corporate" where the arrest was made. Upon "proof to the
satisfaction of the judge or magistrate" that the person
arrested was a fugitive slave, the statute provided that "it shall
1402 [Vol. 69:4
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be the duty of such judge or magistrate to give a certificate" to
allow the claimant to remove the fugitive.2 This law seemed to
require that judges enforce and implement the law, although
the term "duty" is unclear. However, the law provided no
penalty for a judge or magistrate who did not do his "duty." Nor
did the law set any standard process for appeal of the decision
of a judge who found the claimant's evidence unpersuasive. The
law did provide a penalty of five hundred dollars for anyone
who "shall knowingly and willingly obstruct or hinder such
claimant."22 However, this provision does not seem to have
applied to judges who might refuse to hear such a case. Thus it
is hard to know exactly how Congress intended "duty" to apply
to a state judge or magistrate.
There appears to have been no immediate remedy if a
state judge refused to take jurisdiction in a fugitive slave case.
Similarly there was no remedy if a judge arbitrarily ruled
against the claimant. For example, antislavery activists wrote
in the abolitionist newspaper The Liberator about an 1807
Vermont case, in which Justice Theophilus Harrington,
speaking for a unanimous Vermont Supreme Court, refused to
return a fugitive slave to his New York owner, declaring, "If
the master could show a bill of sale, or grant, from the
Almighty, then his title to him would be complete: otherwise it
would not."' Although perhaps apocryphal, this unreported
decision was viewed by abolitionists as an example of how
judges ought to deal with the Fugitive Slave Law.
The abolitionist argument implied by the opinion
attributed to Justice Harrington raised the issue of a judge's
"duty" to a new level. If a state judge refused to take a case or
took a case and then refused to issue a certificate of removal,
what could a claimant do? The claimant might have gone to a
federal judge to ask for a certificate of removal. In theory the
claimant could have also asked for a writ of mandamus to force
the state judge to act. Moreover, if the claimant was able to
find a federal judge, he would not need a mandamus to be
directed at the local or state judge, since he could get his
certificate of removal directly from the federal judge. However,
at this time there were relatively few federal judges in the
21 Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, § 3, 1 Stat. 302, 302-05 (1793) (respecting
fugitives from justice, and persons escaping from the service of their masters).
22 Id. at 305.




nation - most of the northern states had only one federal
district judge before 1850. Alternatively, if one state judge
refused to act under the 1793 law, there was nothing to prevent
the claimant from finding another state judge or magistrate to
help him. This would not even have been an appeal, since the
first judge's refusal to act under the law would not have
produced an opinion, or anything else, to appeal. But all these
alternatives would have been expensive and time consuming
and might not have accomplished anything. While the claimant
was seeking a second forum under the 1793 law, the slave
would have been free to leave the region, since the claimant
would have had no legal authority to hold a black person again
his or her will, especially after a magistrate had in effect
declared that there was not enough evidence to hold the person
as a fugitive slave. Alerted to what was happening, the alleged
slave would probably have moved away, gone into hiding, or
left the country. Thus, whatever the term "duty" meant in the
1793 law, it does not appear to have had a practical effect on
northern judges beyond setting out what they ought to do. The
term clearly did not set out what they had to do.
III. PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS
Initially the northern states cooperated with the
fugitive slave law. Most northern jurists who heard cases
under the law made good faith attempts to enforce it. For
example, in 1819, Pennsylvania Chief Justice William
Tilghman enforced the federal law while denying that a
fugitive slave had the right to a jury trial.24 Similarly, in 1823
Chief Justice Isaac Parker of Massachusetts also upheld the
1793 law25 but limited his analysis to "a single point, whether
the statute of the United States giving power to seize a slave
without a warrant is constitutional."' Parker upheld this
warrantless seizure because "slaves are not parties to the
[C]onstitution, and the [Fourth] [A]mendment has [no] relation
to the parties."7 Parker noted, without any citation or actual
reference to the Constitution, that "[t]he [C]onstitution does
not prescribe the mode of reclaiming a slave, but leaves it to be
Wright v. Deacon, 5 Serg. & Rawle 62 (Pa. 1819).
Commonwealth v. Griffith, 19 Mass. (2 Pick) 11 (1823).
21 Id. at 18.
27 Id. at 19.
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determined by Congress."' Thus, despite the story of Justice
Harrington in Vermont, there were no mass revolts against the
law by northern judges.
The northern states did, however, pass a number of
laws to provide procedural protections for people claimed as
fugitive slaves. In the 1820s Maine, New Jersey, New York,
and Pennsylvania passed laws to protect the personal liberty of
their black residents. Known as "personal liberty laws," these
acts were designed to protect free blacks from kidnapping while
at the same time providing some mechanism for the state to
comply with the federal obligation to return fugitive slaves to
their owners.' In order to prevent fraud, kidnapping, and the
wrongful seizure of free blacks, these laws required a stronger
evidentiary basis for the removal of a black from a free state to
a slave state than did the federal law of 1793. The federal law
of 1793 allowed a master to seize a fugitive slave and bring
that slave before any state or federal judge, who would then
issue a certificate of removal for the black. The federal law had
a very lax standard for determining if the person seized was
indeed a fugitive slave, requiring only proof "either by oral
testimony or affidavit taken before and certified by a
magistrate" in the state where the claimant resided that the
claimant actually owned a slave as described in the affidavit or
testimony.0 Under the federal law, anyone willing to commit
perjury might easily kidnap a free black by giving false oral
testimony claiming the person was a fugitive slave.
The personal liberty laws were aimed at preventing
such frauds. Typical of these laws was Pennsylvania's act of
1826,31 which required that anyone removing a black person
from the state must first obtain a warrant from a Pennsylvania
judge, who would then direct the sheriff to arrest the alleged
fugitive. In order to obtain the warrant, the claimant had to
prove a prima facie ownership through "oath, or affirmation"
while also producing "the affidavit of the claimant of the
fugitive, taken before and certified by a justice of the peace or
Id.
29 For a general history of these laws, see THOMAS D. MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL:
THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF THE NORTH, 1780-1861 (1974).
" Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, § 3, 1 Stat. 302, 303-05 (1793) (respecting
fugitives from justice, and persons escaping from the service of their masters).
"' Act of Mar. 25, 1826, ch. 50, 1826 Pa. Laws 150 (giving effect to the
provisions of the Constitution of the United States relative to fugitives from labor, for
the protection of free people of color, and to prevent kidnapping), quoted in Prigg v.
Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
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other magistrate authorized to administer oaths in the state or
territory in which such claimant shall reside, and accompanied
by the certificate of the authority of such justice or other
magistrate to administer oaths, signed by the clerk or
prothonotary, and authenticated by the seal of a court of
record, in such state or territory, which affidavit shall state the
said claimant's title to the service of such fugitive, and also the
name, age, and description of the person of such fugitive.""
Once this was done, the sheriff could arrest the alleged
fugitive and bring him back to the judge for a hearing on
whether to issue a certificate of removal. The law allowed for
removal of the fugitive "upon proof to the satisfaction of such
judge"' that the person arrested was a fugitive slave owned by
the claimant. However, at this stage the statute provided that
"the oath of the owner or owners, or other person interested,
shall in no case be received in evidence before the judge on the
hearing of the case."" Thus, the claimant needed some proof of
ownership, such a bill of sale, eyewitness testimony from a
disinterested third party, or some sort of certified record from a
lower court.
These standards required far more evidence than the
federal law. They were also more likely to lead to adverse
results for a claimant. The state judges had the power to
actually consider evidence before sending an African-American
back to the South. The 1826 law also provided that state judges
who refused to hear fugitive slave cases could be fined. Thus,
unlike the "duty" provision of the federal law, the Pennsylvania
law actually backed up the "duty" requirement with an
enforcement mechanism. Northerners saw these laws as good
faith attempts to balance the needs of the free states to prevent
kidnapping with the rights of slave owners under the
Constitution.
Only after reviewing the status of an alleged fugitive
slave under the state law, could a Pennsylvania judge or
magistrate comply with the "duty" imposed by the federal law.
The juxtaposition of these two laws shows that while
Pennsylvania recognized it had a "duty" to enforce the federal
law, it would only do so under its own rules. This condition
clearly had the potential to wreak havoc on national law
enforcement by setting the stage for each state to create its
32 Id. § iV.
3 Id. § VI.
34 id.
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own rules for implementing a federal law. It is hard to imagine
a more chaotic scheme for law enforcement. Moreover,
southern claimants would have found such a system
intolerable. How could they hope to vindicate a right, created
by the Constitution and enforced by a federal statute, if they
could not be certain that courts would uniformly interpret and
apply the law? How could a master know what the rules would
be in each state? Against this background the Court decided
Prigg v. Pennsylvania.
IV. PRIGG V. PENNSYLVANIA AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
DOCTRINE OF UNFUNDED MANDATES
In 1837, Edward Prigg, Nathan Bemis, and two other
Marylanders traveled to York County, Pennsylvania, where
they obtained a warrant from a Pennsylvania justice of the
peace to arrest Margaret Morgan and her family. Prigg and his
associates asserted that Morgan was a fugitive slave owned by
Margaret Ashmore, who was Bemis's mother-in-law. Mrs.
Ashmore was the widow of a small farmer named John
Ashmore who had lived in Harford County, Maryland. John
Ashmore had owned Margaret Morgan's parents (whose names
are unknown), but shortly after the War of 1812 he allowed
them to live as free people. Margaret was raised in this
environment and always considered herself to be free.
Sometime in the mid-1820s Margaret married a free black man
from Pennsylvania named Jerry Morgan. The Morgans lived in
Harford County, Maryland, where the 1830 census recorded
them and their two children as "free black" persons." Clearly,
the county sheriff, who took the census, believed Margaret and
her children were free. In 1832 the Morgans moved to
Pennsylvania and in 1837 Margaret Ashmore sent Nathan S.
Bemis, her son-in-law, to bring Margaret back to Maryland as
a fugitive slave. Bemis brought three neighbors with him,
including Edward Prigg.
The four Marylanders arrested Margaret and her family
under a warrant issued by Justice of the Peace Thomas
Henderson. But, when the Morgans were brought before
Henderson he refused to give Bemis and Prigg the authority to
remove them from the state. Acting under the state law, rather
than the federal law, Henderson concluded that the African-




Americans before him were not slaves. Jerry Morgan was
clearly a free black born in Pennsylvania and one or two of
their children had been born in Pennsylvania and were thus
born free under Pennsylvania law. Margaret's parents were
once slaves but she had never been considered a slave. Justice
of the Peace Henderson clearly thought she was free.
Henderson released the Morgans, but Bemis and Prigg
then grabbed Margaret and her children - but not Jerry
Morgan - and forcibly removed them to Maryland. The four
Marylanders were indicted for kidnapping and after two years
of negotiations between the governors of the two states,
Maryland agreed to allow only one of the indicted men, Edward
Prigg, to be extradited to Pennsylvania for prosecution. The
agreement between the two governors provided that if Prigg
was convicted he would not be incarcerated until the U.S.
Supreme Court heard his appeal. As expected, a jury in York
County convicted Prigg for violating the 1826 act, and the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court quickly upheld the conviction
without an opinion. In 1842 the case went to the Supreme
Court.'
In an elaborate opinion 7 Justice Joseph Story, speaking
for an eight-to-one majority, overturned Edward Prigg's
conviction for kidnapping Margaret Morgan and her children.
In his opinion, Justice Story reached five major conclusions: 1)
that the federal Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 was constitutional;
2) that no state could pass any law that added additional
requirements to the federal law or impeded the return of
fugitive slaves; 3) that claimants (masters or their agents) had
a constitutionally protected common law right of recaption, or
"self-help," that allowed a claimant to seize any fugitive slave
anywhere and to bring that slave back to the South without
complying with the provisions of the Fugitive Slave Law of
1793; 4) that a captured fugitive slave was entitled to only a
summary proceeding to determine if he was the person
described in the papers provided by the claimant; and 5) that
state officials should, but could not be required to, enforce the
Fugitive Slave Law.' In his opinion, Story wrote:
' For a discussion of these facts, see Paul Finkelman, Story Telling on the
Supreme Court: Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Justice Joseph Story's Judicial
Nationalism, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 247 (1995), and Paul Finkelman, Sorting Out Prigg v.
Pennsylvania, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 605 (1993).
" For a larger discussion of Story's opinion, see Finkelman, Story Telling on
the Supreme Court, supra note 36.
Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 536-42 (1842).
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We hold the [1793] act to be clearly constitutional in all its leading
provisions, and, indeed, with the exception of that part which confers
authority upon state magistrates, to be free from reasonable doubt
and difficulty upon the grounds already stated. As to the authority
so conferred upon state magistrates, while a difference of opinion has
existed, and may exist still on the point, in different states, whether
state magistrates are bound to act under it; none is entertained by
this Court that state magistrates may, if they choose, exercise that
authority, unless prohibited by state legislation.39
Story in fact suggested that it might be unconstitutional
to require state officials to enforce the fugitive slave law,
noting:
The states cannot, therefore, be compelled to enforce them; and it
might well be deemed an unconstitutional exercise of the power of
interpretation, to insist that the states are bound to provide means
to carry into effect the duties of the national government, nowhere
delegated or intrusted to them by the Constitution. On the contrary,
the natural, if not the necessary conclusion is, that the national
government, in the absence of all positive provisions to the contrary,
is bound, through its own proper departments, legislative, judicial,
or executive, as the case may require, to carry into effect all the
rights and duties imposed upon it by the Constitution. The remark of
Mr. Madison, in the Federalist (No. 43) would seem in such cases to
apply with peculiar force. "A right (says he) implies a remedy; and
where else would the remedy be deposited, than where it is
deposited by the Constitution?" meaning, as the context shows, in
the government of the United States. °
Thus, in 1842, in a case dealing with slavery, the
Supreme Court for the first time addressed the
constitutionality of "conscripting" state officials. Story's opinion
is perhaps less clear than one would have liked, and perhaps
even less clear than one might find in a modern case. He does
not exactly tell us if Congress can force a state official to act;
rather, consistent with nineteenth century respect for
federalism, he allows that the States might prevent officials
from acting. Nevertheless, despite its antique ring, the opinion
comes down against what today we call unfunded mandates.
Oddly, Justice Scalia did not cite Prigg to bolster his contention
that the law at issue in Printz was unconstitutional, even
though he could have mustered the intellectual support of
Justice Story. Perhaps Justice Scalia did not do so because he
would have been citing a case that otherwise supported slavery
Id. at 622.
,0 Id. at 615-16.
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and was indeed, next to Dred Scott, the most important judicial
support for slavery in our constitutional jurisprudence.
V. THE EFFECT OF PRIGG ON THE FEDERAL-STATE BALANCE
Prigg, and the issue of fugitive slaves in general,
illustrates one of the major problems of "conscripting" state
officials: A state official is elected or appointed to enforce state
laws and state policy. State policy may be at odds with federal
policy. Thus, the conscripted state official might be forced to
choose between his oath to the state and the mandates of the
federal government. Furthermore, state officials are the
servants of a local or state-wide electorate. State and local
sentiments may be at odds with national policy. Thus,
compelling state officials to enforce national policy can be
counterproductive. The political reality of enforcement could
lead to a destruction of the very policy that the national
government is seeking to implement. If state officials are forced
to implement a policy that they oppose, then they will do a poor
job; they may undermine the federal policy by their lack of
serious enforcement. The image of Justice Harrington is real.
In the years after Prigg a number of northern judges simply
refused to enforce the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793, even though
under Prigg they were legally free to do so, and in Story's eyes
had a constitutional or even moral obligation to do so.'
Southern masters complained, even before Prigg, that northern
officials were unhelpful in returning fugitive slaves. This
problem was finally solved by the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850,"'
which federalized enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Clause of
the U.S. Constitution. In passing this statute, Congress
understood that conscripting state officials to do the work of
the federal government was a bad idea because, as experience
had shown, it may not work. Thus, Congress thought it better
to simply have the federal government enforce its own laws, or
to pay (rather than conscript) state officials to be part of the
enforcement process.
In his opinion, Story suggested that states could, if they
chose, refuse to allow their officials to enforce the federal law.
"' For a discussion of judges who refused to enforce the law, see Paul
Finkelman, Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Northern State Courts: Anti-Slavery Use of a
Pro-Slavery Decision, 25 CIV. WAR HIST. 5 (1979).
" Act Respecting Fugitives from Justice, and Persons Escaping from the
Service of Their Masters, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (1850) [hereinafter Fugitive Slave Act].
[Vol. 69:41410
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A number of states followed Story's "hint" - if that is what it
can be called - and prohibited their judges from hearing cases
under the federal Fugitive Slaw Law of 1793." In 1851 Story's
son, William Wetmore Story, claimed" that his father intended
his decision in Prigg to undermine the enforcement of the
Fugitive Slave Law of 1793. According to William Wetmore
Story, Justice Story "repeatedly and earnestly spoke" of his
Prigg opinion as a "triumph of freedom."" The evidence for this
is weak. Except for his son's published statements after Story's
death, there is no evidence at all that the justice ever took this
position. He did not make this claim in any of his private
letters and no other friend, ally, or colleague of the Justice ever
supported it. The very fact that William Wetmore Story's
statement was made after his father's death seems suspicious.
Unlike his father, the younger Story was a committed opponent
of slavery, and he seems to have wanted to paint his father in
the best light. Indeed, it would have been entirely out of
character, and completely inconsistent with his entire life's
work, for Justice Story to have secretly attempted to
undermine the authority of the national government or the
U.S. Constitution." In reality, Justice Story's goal in Prigg was
not to weaken slavery, but to strengthen federal power. By
removing state judges from the process, Story in effect forced
Congress to assume a more aggressive role in the return of
fugitive slaves. Story's own actions illustrate this.
In 1842, shortly before the decision in Prigg was
announced, Story sent a private letter to Senator John
Macpherson Berrien of North Carolina, urging a recodification
of all federal criminal law and the extension of the common law
to all federal admiralty jurisdiction.4 '7 This was consistent with
his life-long attempts to expand federal powers and federal
" Act of March 24, 1843, to Further Protect Personal Liberty, 1843 Mass.
Acts 33; Act for the Protection of Personal Liberty, 1844 Conn. Pub. Acts; Act for the
Protection of Personal Liberty, 1843 Vt. Acts & Resolves; Act for the Further Protection
of Personal Liberty, 1846 N.H. Laws; Act to Prevent Kidnapping, Preserve the Public
Peace, Prohibit the Exercise of Certain Powers Heretofore Exercised by Judges, Justice
of the Peace, Aldermen and Jailors in This Commonwealth, and to Repeal Certain
Slave Laws, 1847 Pa. Laws 206-08. See generally MORRIS, supra note 29.
" 2 LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, AND DANE PROFESSOR OF LAW AT HARVARD
UNIVERSITY 392 (William Wetmore Story ed., 1851) [hereinafter LIFE AND LETTERS].
45 id.
" See Finkelman, Story Telling on the Supreme Court, supra note 36, at 282-
94.
47 LIFE AND LETTERS, supra note 44, at 402-03 (Letter from Joseph Story to
Senator John Macpherson Berrien (Feb. 8, 1842)).
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jurisdiction in criminal and civil matters. 8 It also comports
with his opinion in Swift v. Tyson, 9 delivered the same month
as Prigg.
Shortly after the Court decided Prigg, Story again wrote
to Senator Berrien about various legislative matters. The letter
began with a discussion of their collaboration on legislation
involving federal criminal law and bankruptcy. This evidence
suggests the close relationship Story had with the slaveholding
North Carolina senator, and thus makes his next suggestion
even more important. Story began to discuss the draft bill on
federal jurisdiction that he had sent to Berrien. He reminded
Berrien that in that draft legislation he had suggested
that in all cases, where by the Laws of the [United States], powers
were conferred on State Magistrates, the same powers might be
exercised by Commissioners appointed by the Circuit Courts. I was
induced to make the provision thus general, because State
Magistrates now generally refuse to act, & cannot be compelled to
act; and the Act of 1793 respecting fugitive slaves confers the power
on State Magistrates to act in delivering up Slaves. You saw in the
case of Prigg... how the duty was evaded, or declined. In conversing
with several of my Brethren on the Supreme Court, we all thought
that it would be a great improvement, & would tend much to
facilitate the recapture of Slaves, if Commissioners of the Circuit
Court were clothed with like powers.'
Essentially, Story presented Senator Berrien with the
solution to the debate over federal exclusivity and the role of
the States in enforcing the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793.
Through the appointment of commissioners, the federal
government would supply the enforcement mechanism so that
enforcement would be uniform throughout the nation. The
fundamental problem with this idea was how to enact it in a
Congress where northerners, who were at least somewhat
opposed to slavery, controlled the House of Representatives.
Story, the Justice, had the solution for Berrien, the politician:
This might be done without creating the slightest sensation in
Congress, if the provision were made general .... It would then pass
without observation. The Courts would appoint commissioners in
every county, & thus meet the practical difficulty now presented by
See Finkelman, Story Telling on the Supreme Court, supra note 36, at 282-
94.
" 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
' JAMES MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 262
n.94 (1971) (Letter from Joseph Story to Senator John Macpherson Berrien (April 29,
1842)) (citing John Macpherson Berrien Papers, Southern Historical Collection,
University of North Carolina).
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the refusal of State Magistrates. It might be unwise to provoke
debate to insert a Special clause in this first section, referring to the
fugitive Slave Act of 1793. Suppose you add at the end of the first
section: "& shall & may exercise all the powers, that any State judge,
Magistrate, or Justice of the Peace may exercise under any other
Law or Laws of the United States."5'
This was not the letter of a man hoping for a "triumph of
freedom." This was the letter of a Justice committed to the
return of fugitive slaves and to the aggrandizement of federal
power. Here he could have both. In effect, Story was arguing
that the national government, not the States, should be in the
business of enforcing federal law.
In 1850 Congress followed the outlines of this strategy
when it passed the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850. That law
created United States commissioners in every county, whose
powers included hearing and deciding fugitive slave cases.
Many of these commissioners were local lawyers, and some
were even state officeholders or state judicial officials. For
example, in Boston one of the commissioners was a probate
judge.52
In the 1850 law Congress did what it should have done
in the Brady Act and the USA PATRIOT Act: It provided its
own enforcement mechanisms for its own laws. The 1850 law is
correctly seen as a draconian, punitive, and unfair statute that
denied alleged slaves the most basic procedural protections.
Ironically, its enforcement mechanism was remarkably rational
and respectful of federalism. Through the creation of local
commissioners, Congress provided for federal enforcement of a
federal law. This made for more efficient and predictable
enforcement than what had existed under the 1793 law, when
claimants had, for the most part, to rely on local law judges and
magistrates who were often opposed to the law. By allowing for
the appointment of local officials as commissioners, Congress
provided a mechanism for taking advantage of local expertise
and manpower, but yet at the same time did not dragoon local
officials into acting against their own interests and own
political and law enforcement needs. One need not endorse the
substance of the 1850 law - which was truly an affront to
justice and fairness - to appreciate the value of its enforcement
apparatus.
Id. at 262-63 n.94.
Paul Finkelman, Legal Ethics and Fugitive Slaves: The Anthony Burns




As we face the USA PATRIOT Act and the demands
that the states enforce federal laws, there are lessons from
Prigg, Printz, and the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 that we can
learn.
First, it is clear that local officials may not always
support federal law or wish to enforce it. Sheriffs Jay Printz
and Richard Mack did not want to enforce the Brady Bill. It
ran counter to their own political views and presumably to the
desires of the constituency they served. Many of the people who
elected them, and who paid them with their taxes, opposed the
law. Printz and Mack did not want to be the servants of the
national government in regulating firearm ownership. Had
they been required to enforce it, they would have done so
grudgingly, and perhaps not done a very good job. Similarly,
many northern judges were loath to become complicit in
returning fugitive slaves to their owners. Many states
adamantly resisted a federal law that seemed to facilitate
kidnapping. Ultimately, however, it mattered little whether the
claimant seized a bona fide fugitive slave, or was attempting to
legally kidnap a free person, or had seized someone, like
Margaret Morgan, whose status was truly in doubt. Whatever
the substantive issue, northerners in general were unlikely to
want to aid in the return of fugitive slaves.
Likewise, we can certainly imagine under present
circumstances that at least some state and local law
enforcement officers will be reluctant to implement a federal
law against people in their community who may be remotely
connected to terrorists - or, for that matter, even utterly
unconnected to terrorists. In the Detroit area for example, local
law enforcement officials were unwilling to interrogate large
numbers of their constituents, merely because those
constituents were Moslems or of Arab or Middle Eastern
backgrounds.' Efficient law enforcement may not be possible if
the national government has to rely on state officials. Because
of differentials in training, sophistication, and experience, it is
also possible that local law enforcement will do an inadequate
See, e.g., Fox Butterfield, A Nation Challenged: The Interviews; A Police
Force Rebuffs F.B.I. on Querying Mideast Men, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2001, at B7; Jodi
Wilgoren, University of Michigan Won't Cooperate in Federal Canvass, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
1, 2001, at B6.
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job of enforcing federal law, even when the local leadership
supports the law.
Second, it also seems obvious that if the national
government cannot rely on the states, it must expand its own
enforcement machinery. In his dissent in Printz, Justice John
Paul Stevens noted:
Perversely, the majority's rule seems more likely to damage than to
preserve the safeguards against tyranny provided by the existence of
vital state governments. By limiting the ability of the Federal
Government to enlist state officials in the implementation of its
programs, the Court creates incentives for the National Government
to aggrandize itself. In the name of State's rights, the majority would
have the Federal Government create vast national bureaucracies to
implement its policies. This is exactly the sort of thing that the early
Federalists promised would not occur, in part as a result of the
National Government's ability to rely on the magistracy of the
States.u
In a footnote to the paragraph, Stevens notes:
The Court raises the specter that the National Government seeks
the authority "to impress into its service... the police officers of the
50 States." But it is difficult to see how state sovereignty and
individual liberty are more seriously threatened by federal reliance
on state police officers to fulfill this minimal request than by the
aggrandizement of a national police force. The Court's alarmist
hypothetical is no more persuasive than the likelihood that Congress
would actually enact any such program."
This is exactly what happened with the Fugitive Slave
Law of 1850. Federal enforcement made the law more efficient,
although it never worked well."6 We can imagine that this will
also happen with laws like the one at issue in Printz, assuming
Congress ever passes such a law, or with the USA PATRIOT
Act.
But it is not at all clear that Justice Stevens is correct in
his speculation that federal enforcement will be a greater
threat to civil liberties than state enforcement. Police
corruption scandals in Los Angeles, Chicago, New York City,
Philadelphia, and many other places suggest one danger of
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 959 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 959 n.21 (citation omitted).
In the eleven years that it was in force, fewer than 375 fugitive slaves were
returned to the South. STANLEY W. CAMPBELL, THE SLAVE CATCHERS: ENFORCEMENT
OF THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW, 1850-1860, 199-207 tbls. (1968). Based on fugitives
reported in the 1850 census, at least 10,000 slaves escaped in that period, and probably
another ten to twenty thousand fugitives were already living in the North. Thus, the
law did little to actually facilitate the return of runaway slaves.
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local law enforcement. The failure of law enforcement to
implement state and federal civil rights laws in the deep South
was notorious until very recently. The violations of civil rights
by police in New York City, Los Angeles, and elsewhere further
underscores the misplaced faith Justice Stevens may have in
local enforcement.
The historical example of the situation during World
War I also illustrates this point. During that war, local
authorities were often far more repressive than the national
government."7 The willingness of states to oppress religious and
ethnic minorities' is well known. Furthermore, the training of
local law enforcement is often less rigorous and less successful
than the training of federal officers. Anyone who has traveled
through airports has realized that the federally-trained and
monitored security staffs at most airports are far more polite,
efficient, and competent than the security personnel were
before the system was federalized.
The federalization of airport security is perhaps similar
to the model Congress created in the Fugitive Slave Law of
1850. The Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 of course did not protect
the civil liberties of alleged fugitive slaves or their allies. On
the contrary, it was one of the most draconian laws ever passed
by Congress. It was passed to implement a proslavery
Constitution,' and the law reflected the pre-Civil War
Constitution. At least two states tried to limit the reach of the
law, although with little success.
17 See PAUL L. MURPHY, WORLD WAR I AND THE ORIGIN OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN
THE UNITED STATES (1979).
" See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (vindicating the rights of
Americans to teach foreign languages to their children in the face of xenophobic laws in
Nebraska and elsewhere that were designed to prohibit immigrants, especially
German-speaking immigrants, from teaching their native languages to their children).
For more on this case, see Paul Finkelman, German Victims and American Oppressors:
The Cultural Backgroud and Legacy of Meyer v. Nebraska, in LAW AND THE GREAT
PLAINS: ESSAYS ON THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE HEARTLAND 33 (John R. Wunder ed.,
1996). For a full history of this persecution throughout the nation, see also WILLIAM G.
ROSS, FORGING NEW FREEDOMS: NATIVISM, EDUCATION, AND THE CONSTITUTION, 1917-
1927 (1994). A similar sort of persecution was directed at Jehovah's Witnesses. For
Supreme Court cases dealing with this problem, see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940), Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), and West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (overruling
Minersville). For a good summary of this persecution of Jehovah's Witnesses, see Renee
C. Redman, Jehovah's Witnesses, in RELIGION AND AMERICAN LAW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA
245-53 (Paul Finkelman ed., 2000), and Paul Finkelman, The Flag Salute Cases, in
RELIGION AND AMERICAN LAW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 186-190 (Paul Finkelman ed., 2000).
9 See FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS, supra note 8, at 3-36.
Wisconsin challenged the law by approving a writ of habeas corpus to
release the abolitionist Sherman Booth, who had helped a slave escape the custody of
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The purpose of looking at this law is emphatically not to
use its substantive procedures as a model for modern
legislation. Rather, it is to illustrate two points about federal
law enforcement and federalism.
First, if Congress chooses to implement a law
enforcement policy, the only sure way to make that policy work
is for the national government to fund and direct that
implementation. Northerners resisted complying with the
Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 because they hated it and thought
it was immoral and wrong. Furthermore, they hated the
policies behind it. In 1864, responding to a changed political
atmosphere - and the secession of eleven slave states -
Congress would repeal both the 1793 and 1850 Fugitive Slave
Laws. A year later a constitutional amendment would radically
change the policies behind the Fugitive Slave Laws.' But, in
the meantime, if Congress wanted to enforce the Fugitive Slave
Clause of the Constitution, it had to do it with a federal
enforcement apparatus. The same thing is true with the Brady
handgun bill. The response to local resistance cannot be to force
local sheriffs to implement the law; rather it is to use federal
money and statutes to create a mechanism for implementation.
My point here is not to praise the fugitive slave laws as models
of civil liberties. Rather, the point is to show that the history of
this law illustrates the problem of expecting the states to
implement federal law.
The second point is that local law enforcement in the
end cannot achieve the policy goals set out by Congress. The
Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 did not work because free state
officials simply would not implement it. Thus, under the
proslavery Constitution of the period, a government dominated
by slaveholders and their northern "doughface" allies passed
U.S. Marshal Stephen Ableman. The Supreme Court rejected this attempt by
Wisconsin to interfere with the law in Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859).
Ohio flirted with going down this road after the Oberlin-Wellington Rescue, but the
Ohio Supreme Court, by a one vote majority, refused to issue a writ of habeas corpus
directed against the federal marshal. Ex parte Bushnell, Ex parte Langston, 9 Ohio St.
77 (1859).
6" U.S. CONST. amend XIII, § 1 ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,
except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall
exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.").
6' "Doughface" was a term of derision for proslavery northerners or
northerners who worked closely with southerners. The term evolved because it was
said that these northern politicians had faces of "dough" which the southerners could
shape any way they wanted. Classic doughfaces included the last three antebellum
presidents, Millard Fillmore, Franklin Pierce, and James Buchanan. Fillmore signed
the 1850 fugitive slave bill into law while Pierce and Buchanan vigorously enforced it.
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the law to implement the Constitution's Fugitive Slave
Clause.' Similarly, the nation cannot rely on local sheriffs to
implement the Brady Handgun bill or expect that local law
enforcement officials would necessarily be in sympathy with
the government's dragnet approach to investigations after the
September 11 attack on the nation.
The lesson of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 and Story's
decision in Prigg is that instead of conscripting state officials
like Printz, Congress might simply create some modem
equivalent of the commissioners or other law enforcement
officials who would be able to implement federal policy. This
would have the advantage of involving local people in federal
investigations and enforcement, but only because they were
hired or volunteered, rather than conscripted. At the same
time, these local people would be subject to federal rules and
federal standards.
Finally, federal enforcement is by its nature limited.
The nation is too big, the enforcement field too vast, for the
government to simply sweep across the nation. The kind of
petty bullying that local law enforcement can easily do is less
likely under a federalized regime. There are of course problems
with federal law enforcement. The FBI, DEA, ATF, INS, IRS
and a host of other agencies have sometimes been incredibly
heavy-handed in their approach to law enforcement. Although
the FBI is unlikely to be run by another J. Edgar Hoover, there
is no reason to believe that law enforcement abuses will never
be a problem in the future. However, it is somewhat easier to
monitor the actions of the federal government than it is to
monitor the actions of the states. The national media can more
easily focus on abuses by federal officials than those committed
by state and local officials.
Moreover, as the example of the Fugitive Slave Law
suggests, if the States are not part of the federal law
enforcement process, they can sometimes protect their own
citizens from arbitrary federal power. Similarly, if States
violate the civil rights of individuals, then the federal
government can become the watchdog. In the age of "homeland
security" it is not unthinkable that a state will step over the
line of constitutional propriety, and that the federal courts
might intervene to protect basic liberty, or the FBI and Justice
Department might also investigate violations of constitutional
' U.S. Constitution, Art. V, Sec. 2, Par. 3.
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rights. But, again, as the fugitive slave experience shows, if the
states become part of the federal law enforcement, then the
States cannot monitor the federal government. Conversely, the
federal government could not monitor the States. Indeed, the
genius - if we can call it that - of American federalism is that
in times of crisis the States can be a check on the national
government and the national government can also be a check
on the States. But if the States become a mere adjunct of the
federal government, then there will be no checking
possibilities, and the potential for the violation of rights is
much greater.

